Introduction
Th e state still is the clef de voute of the international system and of international law. Both social and legal layouts are based on the state. In several codifi cation processes in the International Law Commission (ILC) -particularly with regards to the Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States, the Law of treaties or the Succession of States -attempts were made to clarify the legal meaning of the term 'state' , but no defi nition was fi nally draft ed. Actually, such a defi nition was qualifi ed as controversial 1 or, even, non-useful. 2 A more recent defi nition, however, was given by the Badinter Commission: "Th e State is commonly defi ned as a community which consists of a territory and a population subject to an organised political authority; that such a State is characterised by sovereignty (…)".
3 Classical jurisprudence has also underlined these three core elements, 4 as it has been done by conventional practice of states 5 and doctrine. 9 Th ere are other cases that, in some moments of their recent history, could be equally labelled, like Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina in the fi rst days of its independence, Haiti, Lebanon, Liberia, Rwanda during the days of genocide, Sudan or Sierra Leone, but also Cambodia aft er the 1991 Paris agreement, the Lebanon in the 1980s or, even, China during the 1930s.
10 However, two decades ago, Koskeniemmi put it simply: "[S]tatehood has its reasons it is not a naturalistic deus ex machina. If and when those reasons do not exist, statehood can claim no particular protection"; see Martti Koskeniemmi, 'Th e Future of Statehood' , (1991) 32 Harvard International Law Journal, p. 407-8. Some years earlier, Kristyna Marek expressed a quite similar opinion: "Th ere is a beginning and an end to the state, as to everything else" (Marek, supra n. 6, p. 5). And even earlier, Kelsen opined that "a national legal order begins to be valid as soon as it has become -on the whole -effi cacious; and it ceases to be valid as soon as it loses this effi cacy" (Hans Kelsen, General 7 -and some of the judges in their dissenting or separate opinions -have accepted those three elements, reducing the discussion to the assessment of the eff ectiveness of some of them (particularly an independent government) and the weight to be given to recognition of Kosovo by other states. Existence and recognition of states are thus interlinked terms, notwithstanding their diff erent scope.
8 Th e international community has witnessed (and still witnesses) situations in which some states might not deserve this legal qualifi cation. Th e cases of the Congo around 1960 or Somalia since 1991 are paramount. 9 However, in no case has the international community derived from these situations the extinction of a state as a logical consequence. Th e 'pure' extinction of a state has been scholarly refused due to some terror of sovereignty vacuum, 10 hence labelling the state as 'failed ' . 11 States have also preferred a somehow cynical presumption of statehood instead of admitting the disappearance of a state. Paradoxically, they use the same presumption for the admittance of 'new members to the club' barely fulfi lling the criteria of statehood.
12 Legal order,
